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Abstract
Background: In March of 2003, an outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) occurred in
Northern Vietnam. This outbreak began when a traveler arriving from Hong Kong sought medical care at
a small hospital (Hospital A) in Hanoi, initiating a serious and substantial transmission event within the
hospital, and subsequent limited spread within the community.
Methods: We surveyed Hospital A personnel for exposure to the index patient and for symptoms of
disease during the outbreak. Additionally, serum specimens were collected and assayed for antibody to
SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) antibody and job-specific attack rates were calculated. A nested
case-control analysis was performed to assess risk factors for acquiring SARS-CoV infection.
Results: One hundred and fifty-three of 193 (79.3%) clinical and non-clinical staff consented to participate.
Excluding job categories with <3 workers, the highest SARS attack rates occurred among nurses who
worked in the outpatient and inpatient general wards (57.1, 47.4%, respectively). Nurses assigned to the
operating room/intensive care unit, experienced the lowest attack rates (7.1%) among all clinical staff.
Serologic evidence of SARS-CoV infection was detected in 4 individuals, including 2 non-clinical workers,
who had not previously been identified as SARS cases; none reported having had fever or cough. Entering
the index patient's room and having seen (viewed) the patient were the behaviors associated with highest
risk for infection by univariate analysis (odds ratios 20.0, 14.0; 95% confidence intervals 4.1–97.1, 3.6–55.3,
respectively).
Conclusion: This study highlights job categories and activities associated with increased risk for SARS-
CoV infection and demonstrates that a broad diversity of hospital workers may be vulnerable during an
outbreak. These findings may help guide recommendations for the protection of vulnerable occupational
groups and may have implications for other respiratory infections such as influenza.
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Background
A World Health Organization (WHO) medical officer
consulting with physicians at a hospital in Hanoi, Viet-
nam provided one of the earliest descriptions of a respira-
tory illness that later became known as SARS. Suspicions
were first raised in Vietnam when staff at a small private
health care facility, Hospital A, in Hanoi began to fall ill
after caring for a business traveler recently arrived from
Hong Kong [1]. This individual had been admitted to
Hospital A on February 26th (Figure 1), where he received
care for 4 days in the general medical ward and 4 days in
the intensive care unit. On March 5th, he was transferred
to a facility in Hong Kong where he died one week later;
he was subsequently confirmed to have SARS-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection. [2].
Enhanced infection control practices, cohorting of
patients, and increased use of barrier protections were ini-
tiated on March 6th, after it was recognized that a severe
respiratory illness was affecting several staff members.
There were no negative pressure rooms at the hospital.
N95 respirators, goggles, and face shields were made
available to staff on March 12th [Uyeki, personal communi-
cation]. Transmission of SARS-CoV among staff, visitors,
and patients of Hospital A, and their close contacts out-
side the hospital, ultimately resulted in 62 cases of SARS
in Northern Vietnam. Ninety percent of the 62 cases and
all of the deaths (n = 6) occurred among individuals who
visited or worked at Hospital A, which was temporarily
closed on March 18th, 2003.
Hospital A is a small (<60 bed) private facility in Hanoi,
providing inpatient specialist, laboratory, and nursing
services. At the time of the outbreak, in addition to Viet-
namese staff, several expatriate nurses and physicians
were employed, often as clinical specialists on short-term
contract from France. This report describes SARS-CoV sec-
ondary attack rates among the cohort of hospital staff at
Hospital A and presents the results of a nested case-con-
trol study designed to identify risk-factors for SARS-CoV
transmission after admission of the index patient. The pri-
mary objectives were to ascertain the extent of SARS-CoV
transmission among the clinical and non-clinical staff at
the hospital and to determine the nature of the initial
exposures to the index patient that resulted in a substan-
tial transmission event.
Methods
Cohort study population and enrollment
We conducted a survey of symptoms and exposures
among the cohort of workers at Hospital A, and a nested
case-control study to assess risk factors for acquiring
SARS-CoV infection after admission of the index case. For
the latter study, only individuals who had worked at least
one shift during the time the index patient was hospital-
ized were included (Figure 2).
During the outbreak, in the final two days that the hospi-
tal was open (March 17–18, 2003), investigators obtained
a comprehensive list of hospital employees and held
meetings with individual units (i.e., security, nursing, etc.)
to recruit study participants. Upon providing written con-
sent, participants were asked to complete a short, self-
administered questionnaire and to provide a serum spec-
imen for determination of antibodies to SARS-CoV. Ques-
tionnaires were translated into Vietnamese and responses
were back-translated into English. Information was col-
lected regarding the participant's contact with the index
patient during his stay in the hospital from February 26th
(evening) to March 5th, as well as their symptoms from
the time the index patient was admitted to the hospital
until 10 days after he was transferred (~1.5 incubation
periods [3-5]). Self-reported symptoms were checked
against case investigation forms for 42 staff members. Par-
ticipants were asked about whether they had ever engaged
in a series of activities relating to exposure to the index
patient. Questions were simplified in order to minimize
translation errors, ensure that the activities would apply
for multiple different staff job categories (e.g., nurse and
security guard), and to facilitate self-administration.
All exposure variables were comprehensive for the period
that the index patient was hospitalized at Hospital A. For
example, did you enter the general ward, referred to whether
or not the subject entered the general ward at least once at
any time during the index patient's hospitalization. Varia-
bles were not all exclusive. For example subjects were
asked whether they ever came within 1 meter of the index
patient, and whether they ever did so without a mask (res-
pirator). Further information pertaining to the number
Epidemic curve of the SARS outbreak among Hospital A staff,  Hanoi, 2003 Figure 1
Epidemic curve of the SARS outbreak among Hospital A staff, 
Hanoi, 2003.
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and duration of potential encounters was not requested
due to time constraints and concerns about recall bias.
A physician who provided care for SARS patients at Hos-
pital A throughout the outbreak (this physician resided
temporarily at the hospital while the outbreak was ongo-
ing) served as a proxy respondent for the staff who had
died (n = 6) or were too ill (n = 1) to respond at the time
of the survey. This physician had assisted WHO investiga-
tors in conducting the initial staff interviews in early
March following recognition of respiratory illnesses
among staff. Work shift schedules were available for
30.0% of the Hospital staff and were used to verify staff
responses. The protocol was approved following expe-
dited review by the hospital institutional review board
and the Vietnamese Ministry of Health.
Laboratory confirmation of cases
Laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV infection was per-
formed at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(Atlanta, Georgia, USA) and was based either on detection
of RNA from SARS-CoV in clinical specimens (via reverse
transcriptase polymerase chain reaction assays, RT-PCR),
or by serology, as previously described [2]. Case defini-
tions and laboratory assays employed during the outbreak
in Vietnam are described in detail elsewhere [2].
Diagram representing criteria for selection of case and control subjects to evaluate risks for SARS-CoV infection stemming  from hospital exposure to the Hanoi index patient Figure 2
Diagram representing criteria for selection of case and control subjects to evaluate risks for SARS-CoV infection stemming 
from hospital exposure to the Hanoi index patient. (*) SARS cases were confirmed by serologic testing, viral culture, or RT-
PCR performed on specimens obtained from persons with clinically compatible illness. (†) Excluded as study cases were SARS 
cases among the staff who were unlikely to have contracted infection from the index case (i.e., illness onset after March 5th, 
2003 or seroconversion > 18 days after last exposure to the index patient); included as study cases are those SARS cases 
among the staff who had illness onset on or before Mar 5th, or seroconversion within 18 days of last exposure to the index 
case. (‡) Included as study controls were non-cases demonstrated to be negative for SARS-CoV antibody at least 18 days after 
last exposure to the index case. Potential control subjects were excluded from the analysis if no serologic specimen was col-
lected from them or if the specimen was collected too early to assess final outcome status from exposure to the index case 
(i.e., within 18 days of last exposure).
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Nested case-control study
To determine which work-related activities may have been
associated with contracting SARS-CoV infection after
admission of the index case, a case-control study was per-
formed. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for study cases
and controls are outlined in Figure 2.
Study cases were defined as persons having: (i) the pres-
ence of SARS-CoV antibody in at least one serum speci-
men collected prior to March 24th; or (ii) for SARS cases
confirmed by means other that serologic testing (i.e., viral
culture or RT-PCR), illness onset on or before March 5th,
the last day the index patient received care at Hospital A.
SARS Co-V infections resulting from exposure to the index
patient were presumed to have resulted in antibody con-
version on or before March 24th (18 days after the index
patient's discharge) based on a conservative estimated
timeline that includes a 6 day incubation period plus a 12
day interval to seroconversion. The estimated 6 day incu-
bation period is based on the observed median number of
days from exposure to illness onset among persons in
Vietnam who reported only a single potential exposure to
a SARS patient (n = 28). The 12 day estimated interval to
seroconversion is based on the observed median number
of days from illness onset to SARS-CoV antibody serocon-
version among cases in Vietnam for whom the date of
seroconversion is known within 48 hours (n = 17). This
time frame is expected to exclude individuals who con-
tracted infection from someone other than the index,
while capturing the majority of individuals who were
infected during index case's hospitalization in Hanoi,
including a proportion of those who could have been
infected on the last day of exposure to the index patient.
The timing of illness onset alone was insufficient as a case
selection criterion for the case-control study as this infor-
mation was unavailable for many study enrollees.
Controls were defined as individuals within the study
cohort who (i) were never identified as SARS cases, (ii)
worked at least one shift during the time the index patient
was hospitalized, and (iii) did not exhibit evidence of
SARS-CoV specific antibodies within at least 18 days after
last exposure to the index case.
Statistical analyses
Exposure and demographic variables used for analyses
were dichotomous categorical; unknown or missing data
was rendered as a negative response. Non-parametric tests
(Fisher's exact, Cochran's Chi-square) or odds ratios (OR)
with 95% confidence intervals (CI) were used to assess
differences between groups using negative responses as
the referent. The threshold for statistical significance was
established at a p-value < 0.05.
Advanced age (> 50 years) and underlying medical condi-
tions were not significant correlates of case status in this
outbreak [Uyeki, personal communication] and were there-
fore not included in the analysis. All statistical analyses
were performed using SPSS version 11.0.1 (SPSS Inc., Chi-
cago, IL).
Results
Survey of hospital workers
A staff census prepared in February 2003, indicated that
193 individuals were employed at Hospital A at the time
of the SARS outbreak. The distribution of personnel
between clinical and non-clinical roles is shown in Table
1. Twenty-nine of the 36 SARS cases (81%) at Hospital A
occurred among clinical personnel with direct patient care
or ancillary clinical roles. Direct patient care activities
included primary medical functions such as patient exam-
ination and diagnostic evaluation, performance of proce-
dures, and conduct of ongoing care and monitoring. In
addition, non-clinical personnel were affected as well,
with 19% of cases (n = 7) occurring among housekeepers
and other cleaning staff (n = 5), kitchen staff (n = 1), and
receptionists (n = 1). Several of the affected housekeepers
entered the index patient's room on the night he was
admitted to clean vomitus and respiratory secretions from
the floor and walls, and various kitchen staff entered his
room to deliver meals or collect service trays. Figure 1
depicts the epidemiologic curve of SARS illness among
Hospital A personnel.
Two peaks of illness onset among staff were evident, on
March 4th, and 9 days later on the 13th (Figure 1). All but
one of the non-clinical staff cases became ill during the
first apparent wave of the outbreak, which encompassed
the period the index patient was an inpatient at Hospital
A. Housekeepers and certain members of the kitchen staff
had access to the index patient's room(s) during his stay,
for purposes of cleaning and meal delivery. Overall,
observed attack rates were highest among personnel with
direct patient care responsibilities. Notably, however,
nursing staff at Hospital A who were assigned to the oper-
ating Room (Op.Rm.)/intensive care unit (ICU) had sig-
nificantly lower attack rates (7.1, p < 0.006) than did
nurses in other staffing categories. Though mid-wives
might not be anticipated under normal circumstances to
have had opportunities for direct contact with the index
patient, several women who had had complicated deliver-
ies were hospitalized in the inpatient ward or ICU during
the index patient's stay; two briefly shared a room with
him.
Staff enrollment
Overall, 79% of Hospital A staff completed the exposure
and symptom questionnaire, and 64% contributed at
least one serum specimen. The lowest rates of participa-BMC Public Health 2006, 6:207 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/207
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tion in the exposure and symptom survey occurred among
physicians and ICU nurses staffing categories (58.6%,
57.1%, respectively), but in both instances participation
increased to over 64% for the serosurvey (Table 1). Staff
work schedules were used, where possible, to independ-
ently verify a worker's presence at Hospital A during the
index patient's hospitalization. A comparison between
staff work schedules and worker responses is shown in
Table 2. In general, there were fewer non-clinical staff than
clinical staff participants in the serosurvey, but overall,
serosurvey participation met or exceeded 50% in all but
five staffing categories, these being, 'kitchen', 'dental', 'lab-
oratory', 'administration', and 'reception'.
The questionnaire was completed by proxy for seven indi-
viduals who had died or were too ill to complete the ques-
tions at the time of survey administration. Removal of
these respondents from the study pool did not substan-
tively affect study findings (shown below), therefore these
responses were included analyses as appropriate.
Symptomatic illness among Hospital A staff
Results of the survey regarding symptoms of illness expe-
rienced by study participants are summarized in Figure 3.
Consistent with findings from a clinical study of SARS
patients conducted in Vietnam [6], fever, fatigue, myalgia,
Table 1: Hospital A staff by job category – SARS attack rates and serologic profiles, Hanoi, 2003.
SARS outbreak at Hospital A Enrollment number of hospital workers (%)
Staff 
position
Hospital A 
employees
SARS 
cases*
Attack rate† Deaths Completed 
survey
Serologic 
specimen
Enrolled work-
ers with positive 
serologic result‡
Direct patient care Physician§ 29 8 27.6 4 17 (58.6) 19 (65.5) 7 (36.8)
Midwife 10 4 40.0 0 9 (90.0) 8 (80.0) 4 (50.0)
Nurse¶ (gen. 
ward)
19 9 47.4 2 16 (84.2) 19 (100) 10 (52.6) 2 new
Nurse¶ 
(Op.Rm./ICU)
14 1 7.1 0 8 (57.1) 9 (64.3) 0
Nurse¶ 
(other)
7 4 57.1 0 7 (100) 6 (85.7) 4 (66.7)
sub-total 79 26 32.9 6 58 (73.4) 61 (77.2) 26(42.6)
Other clinical staff Dental 3 0 0 0 3 (100) 1 (33.3) 0
Laboratory 7 0 0 0 6 (85.7) 3 (42.9) 0
Pharmacy 2 0 0 0 2 (100) 2 (100) 0
Radiology 6 2 33.3 0 5 (83.3) 5 (83.3) 1 (20.0)
Physiotherapy 1 1 100.0 0 1 (100) 1 (100) 1 (100)
sub-total 19 3 15.8 0 15 (79.0) 12 (63.2) 2 (16.7)
Sanitation/Kitchen Housekeeping 16 4 25.0 0 16 (100) 11 (68.8) 4 (36.4)
Laundry 7 0 0 0 7 (100) 6 (85.7) 1 (16.7) 1 new
Kitchen 5 1 20.0 0 4 (80.0) 2 (40.0) 1 (50.0)
Other 2 1 50.0 0 1 (50) 1 (50.0) 1 (100)
sub-total 30 6 20.0 0 27 (90.0) 20 (66.7) 6 (30.0)
Other non-clinical Administratio
n
28 0 0 0 22 (78.6) 8 (28.6) 0
Reception 13 1 9.1 0 10 (76.9) 6 (46.2) 2 (33.3) 1 new
Security 8 0 0 0 7 (87.5) 6 (75.0) 0
Maintenance 3 0 0 0 3 (100) 3 (100) 0
Operations 13 0 0 0 11 (84.6) 8 (61.5) 0
sub-total 65 1 1.5 0 53 (81.5) 31 (47.7) 2 (6.5)
Total Hospital A 
staff
193 36 18.7 6 153 (79.3) 124 (64.2) 36 (29.0)
* Refers to cases identified during the course of the outbreak. 4 of the 36 initially identified SARS cases during the outbreak did not have serological 
confirmation, and they were replaced by the 4 additional, previously unrecognized, seropositive individuals identified during the serosurvey (n = 36).
† The case fatality rates among physicians, nurses from the general ward, and among staff with patient care duties are 50, 22, and 23%, respectively.
‡ Positive serologic results are listed as 'new' if the individual was not recognized as a symptomatic case during the outbreak, but was found to be 
seropositive during the course of this study.
§ Physicians cases include: Anesthetist/Anesthesiologist (3), General Practitioner (2), Pulmonary Specialist (1), Gynecologist (1), Orthopedic 
Surgeon (1). Radiologists are included in the 'Radiology' category.
¶ Nurses who were assigned to the general inpatient ward, or the intensive care unit/operating room are indicated, others not specifically assigned 
are grouped into a single category.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:207 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/207
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chills, anorexia, headache, and cough were the most fre-
quently reported symptoms experienced by SARS infected
staff at Hospital A. These symptoms occurred in over half
of SARS cases, and all occurred at levels significantly
above those reported by employees without SARS-CoV
infection. Dizziness, shortness of breath and vomiting
were also reported at significantly higher frequencies
among SARS cases than uninfected staff, but nevertheless
were reported by = 40% of SARS cases. Only diarrhea, sore
throat, and rash were not reported at higher frequencies
among SARS cases than uninfected staff. The background
occurrence of rash was low among all participants, but
both sore throat and diarrhea occurred at appreciable
background rates (19% and 20%, respectively) among
staff not infected with SARS-CoV.
Serologic profiles of Hospital A employees
Of the 124 Hospital A staff who participated in the sero-
survey, 36 (29%) had at least one serum specimen that
tested positive for the presence of antibody to SARS-CoV
antigen (Table 1). Four Hospital A staff members with
confirmed SARS-CoV infection did not complete the
questionnaire or participate in the serosurvey. All 32 con-
firmed SARS cases that did participate in the survey tested
positive for the presence of antibody to SARS-CoV anti-
gen. Four additional, previously unrecognized, seroposi-
tive individuals were identified as a consequence of the
serosurvey. Thus, 4 of the 36 initially identified SARS cases
during the outbreak did not have serological confirma-
tion, and they were replaced by the 4 additional, previ-
ously unrecognized, seropositive individuals identified as
a consequence of the serosurvey (n = 36).
These 4 newly identified seropositive individuals (2 gen-
eral ward nurses, 1 laundry worker, and 1 receptionist)
had mild illness and were not identified during the out-
break despite active surveillance conducted among staff at
Hospital A. Among this group, the 2 General Ward nurses
reported having had at least three symptoms associated
with SARS illness in this outbreak (the first reported
fatigue, headache, and shortness of breath; the second
also reported headache along with myalgia, chills, dizzi-
ness, anorexia, and vomiting), but neither reported hav-
ing experienced fever or cough, which were inclusion
criteria in the WHO SARS case definition used at the time.
Both nurses also reported experiencing diarrhea during
Subjective symptoms of illness reposted among staff at Hos- pital A (n = 27 SARS cases, n = 115 non-cases), Hanoi, 2003 Figure 3
Subjective symptoms of illness reposted among staff at Hos-
pital A (n = 27 SARS cases, n = 115 non-cases), Hanoi, 2003. 
The presence of an asterisk indicates that the symptom was 
significantly associated with SARS case status (p < 0.05, 
Fisher's exact, two-sided). (#) indicates sample sizes for cases 
and non-cases of 8, and 58 respectively.
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
Fever#
Fatigue#
Myalgia
Chills
Anorexia
Headache
Cough
Dizziness
Diarrhea
Shortness of breath
Vomiting
Sore throat
Rash
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Percent of SARS cases and non-cases reporting symptoms, Hanoi, 
2003
*
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*
*
*
*
*
*
Table 2: Comparison of survey responses and staff work schedules during the SARS index patient's hospitalization in Hanoi, Vietnam.
Worked at least one shift during index patient's 
hospitalization, 26 February-5 March, 2003
Staff position Completed Survey n (%) No. surveyed who reported 
working
No. scheduled to work* Agreement (%)†
Midwife (n = 10) 9 (90) 9 8 88.9
Nurse (Op.Rm./ICU) (n = 14) 7 (50) 6 6 100
Housekeeper (n = 16) 16 (100) 15 16 93.8
Receptionist (n = 10‡)9  ( 9 0 ) 9 7 7 7 . 8
Security (n = 8) 7 (87.5) 7 7 100
Total (n = 58) 48 (82.8) 46 44 95.7§
* Shift schedules were obtained from Hospital A human resources administration for approximately 30% of Hospital A staff.
† Agreement between reported and scheduled work activity among surveyed staff.
‡ Receptionist does not include cashiers (1) and store clerks (2) who also worked in the reception area of Hospital A and who are included in 
Reception category in Table 1.
§ Kappa score κ = 0.476 (p = 0.002); suggests intermediate qualitative agreement for two reporting sources.BMC Public Health 2006, 6:207 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/207
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the study period. However, diarrhea was common among
all Hospital A workers (23% of all reporting workers)
regardless of SARS case status. Neither the laundry worker
nor the receptionist reported having experienced symp-
toms significantly associated with SARS illness in Viet-
nam, with the exception that the latter reported vomiting.
Nested case-control study
Twenty-two study cases and 45 controls were identified
(Figure 2). (Confirmed SARS cases not included in the
study were excluded on the basis of illness onset date, date
of seroconversion, or insufficient information to classify.)
Nearly all activities associated with physical proximity to
the index patient or to his hospital rooms were signifi-
cantly associated with SARS-CoV infection by univariate
analysis (Table 3). However, touching the index patient
(with or without personal protective equipment in the
form of gloves, gown, face mask) or speaking to him in his
room, were not significantly associated with SARS-CoV
infection. Having had a job that involved direct patient
care or sanitation/kitchen duties was also not associated
with SARS-CoV infection. Having a non-clinical staff posi-
tion was nominally protective (O.R. = 0.2, p = 0.011)
against SARS-CoV infection, as was having had an upper-
respiratory infection ('head cold', O.R. = 0.2, p = 0.039)
within the prior 6 months.
Multivariate analyses were not performed due to the lim-
ited size of the study population.
Discussion
SARS has been documented, under certain circumstances,
to be highly communicable in hospital settings. Attack
rates among workers with direct patient care roles have
been observed as high as 10.0 and 11.8% in Canada and
Hong Kong, respectively [5,7]. This study examined early
events after the admission of a patient with SARS-CoV
infection into a small hospital, at a time before the risks
from unprotected exposure to SARS patients were fully
appreciated. Our findings highlight the potential SARS
transmission risks to hospital workers from potentially
infectious surfaces and from proximity to a symptomatic
patient.
During several other outbreaks, airborne transmission of
SARS-CoV was suggested as an important route of trans-
mission in hospitals and residential settings [8-10]. Our
findings do not allow us to discriminate between poten-
tial transmission via large droplet versus dilute aerosols,
although large scale transmission through a concentrated
'plume' of virus seems less likely here, as proximity to the
index patient was nearly universal among those who were
infected. These findings have important implications for
worker protection, as many different categories of workers
perform activities that may bring them into proximity
with a SARS-CoV infected individual.
Table 3: Single variable analysis of risk factors for SARS Co-V infection among hospital staff cases and controls, Hanoi, 2003.
SARS cases Controls
Activities During Index Patient's Hospitalization OR* 95% CI p-value† n = 22 % n = 45 %
Touched index patient 2.8 0.9–8.5 0.085 9 (41) 9 (20)
Talked to or touched index patient without mask‡ (ever) 1.9 0.6–5.9 0.363 7 (32) 9 (20)
Came within 1 meter of index patient 9.3 2.8–30.9 <0.001 17 (77) 12 (27)
Came within 1 meter of index patient, without mask‡ (ever) 5.4 1.8–16.3 0.003 14 (64) 11 (24)
Spoke with index patient 3.5 1.2–10.4 0.028 11 (50) 10 (22)
Entered patient room 20.0 4.1–97.1 <0.001 20 (91) 15 (33)
Spoke with index patient in his room 3.7 1.1–12.6 0.052 8 (36) 6 (13)
Saw (viewed) index patient 14.0 3.6–55.3 <0.001 19 (86) 14 (31)
Visited patient room when patient was not there 3.7 1.3–10.9 0.027 12 (55) 11 (24)
Touched visibly contaminated surface 7.8 2.3–25.9 0.001 12 (55) 6 (13)
Entered general ward 8.0 1.7–38.4 0.005 20 (91) 25 (56)
Other characteristics§
Upper respiratory infection w/in prior 6 months 0.2 0.04–0.9 0.039 2 (9) 15 (33)
'Other' non-clinical job¶ 0.2 0.03–0.7 0.011 2 (9) 18 (40)
Direct patient care activities 2.0 0.7–5.6 0.298 13 (59) 19 (42)
Sanitation/kitchen job 2.2 0.7–7.0 0.223 7 (32) 8 (18)
* Mantel-Haenszel odds ratio; odds ratios refer to affirmative responses.
† Fischer's exact (two-sided).
‡ Respirator or surgical mask; N95 respirator masks were not widely available at Hospital A until March 12th.
§ A proportion of enrollees (n = 19 cases, n = 8 controls) were asked about a history of heart disease, lung disease, diabetes, and smoking. None of 
these factors had a statistically significant association with SARS cases status.
¶ Other non-clinical jobs include administration, reception, security, maintenance, operations (see Table 1).BMC Public Health 2006, 6:207 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/207
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Overall, we found that hospital workers who had greatest
opportunity for proximity to the index patient were clini-
cal staff, and among clinical staff, those with direct patient
care duties experienced the highest attack rates and death
rates among all categories of Hospital A workers. When
Hospital A closed during the SARS outbreak, a second
hospital (Hospital B) was designated to care for suspect
SARS cases. There were no SARS cases among staff at Hos-
pital B, and a serosurvey conducted among workers at the
facility revealed no inapparent or asymptomatic infec-
tions despite the presence of numerous confirmed SARS
cases in the wards [1]. The reasons for the disparity in
infection rates among staff between Hospitals A and B is
unclear, but comparing outcomes between the two hospi-
tals in general supports the importance of enhanced infec-
tion control measures, barrier protections, and patient
isolation, as control measures within hospitals.
A previous study of clinical workers at Hospital A sug-
gested that the proportion of doctors and nurses using
masks as a precautionary measure increased significantly
after the initiation of secondary cases and that the use of
masks had a significant impact on diminishing SARS-CoV
transmission [11]. The potential benefits of enhanced
infection control practices and barrier protections are also
in evidence when looking at differences among workers at
Hospital A who provided direct patient care. Among
nurses at Hospital A, those who administered clinical care
to critically ill or post-operative patients (Op.Rm./ICU
nurses) experienced the lowest attack rates among all
nursing categories, and though few (3 of 8) reported hav-
ing engaged in any of the activities identified as being
associated with risk for SARS-CoV infection (Table 3), it is
possible that the lower overall attack rate for this group of
nurses reflects the fact that routine infection control pre-
cautions employed by Op.Rm./ICU to protect vulnerable
patients in the ICU also provided these nurses with pro-
tection against exposure to SARS-CoV. Studies from other
SARS outbreaks have shown that nurses charged with pro-
viding intensive care to patients experienced relatively
fewer instances of SARS-CoV infection [5], unless assisting
with a high risk procedure such as an endotrachael intu-
bation [12,13].
During the course of this study, four workers, none of
whom had been previously identified as cases, were found
to have been infected with SARS-CoV. None of the four
reported having had cough or fever, but two complained
of diarrhea and another had a sore throat. A similar study
conducted among health care workers in Singapore,
revealed serologic evidence of SARS-CoV infection in two
workers (of 112 exposed individuals) who experienced
only mild symptoms of illness [14]. Both of these individ-
uals had had fever and multiple systemic or upper respira-
tory symptoms, but neither developed pneumonia.
Together, these reports and observations suggest that
SARS-CoV infection can manifest with relatively mild
symptoms, which can be easily masked against a back-
ground of unrelated illnesses in the community. The epi-
demiologic significance of mild (or asymptomatic)
infections remains unclear however, and in this instance
it is not known whether any of the four serologically pos-
itive individuals without pneumonia transmitted SARS-
CoV to their contacts.
There were several limitations to this study. The first is the
small sample size employed for the nested case-control,
which contributed to a general lack of precision in meas-
ures of effect (odds ratios), and precluded our ability to
look for independent risk factors through multivariate
analyses. In addition, because of the need to minimize the
complexity of the questionnaire, we were unable to assess
either the duration, or the intensity of potential expo-
sures, both of which are likely to be important modifiers
of absolute risk. However, our streamlined approach
using generalized questions allowed us to rapidly survey a
large fraction of the hospital worker population, rather
than just medical professionals. Finally, there were several
potential sources of bias in this study which could have
affected our results and conclusions. Although we per-
formed the study prior to closure of the hospital, while the
staff were still actively engaged in the outbreak investiga-
tion, we failed to achieve full staff participation, particu-
larly among physicians and certain categories of nurses.
This could have introduced a selection bias favoring
enrollment of persons with less opportunity for direct
contact with the index patient. Similarly, we questioned
individuals about their exposure to the index patient 13
days after he was transferred to Hong Kong, and used a
proxy to complete exposure questionnaires for deceased
individual. Either of these could have introduced non-sys-
tematic information (recall) bias to our findings. We
attempted to minimize the influence of these potential
sources of bias by using case investigation forms and phy-
sician notes to verify self-reported information when ever
possible.
Many of the job-related activities identified in this study
as potential risk factors for SARS-CoV infection, such as
entering the patient's room, and touching a visibly con-
taminated surface relate to 'proximity' contacts and possi-
bly fomite involvement. These types of contact are
broadly applicable to many different job categories from
receptionist to physician, implying that our concept of
occupational categories at risk for nosocomial infection
may need to be broadened to include many different
kinds of workers without direct patient care duties
[5,7,15,16].BMC Public Health 2006, 6:207 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/207
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Conclusion
The outbreak of SARS in northern Vietnam investigated
here serves as a tragic reminder of the profound impact
that the introduction of a highly communicable, virulent
pathogen can have on the relatively closed community of
a small hospital. In such instances, very early events fol-
lowing introduction can be pivotal in determining the
ultimate magnitude of the outbreak and the degree of
spread within the hospital. Appropriate recognition of
those at highest risk of exposure and illness in conjunc-
tion with rapid, accurate identification of potential cases
at the earliest stages of illness, are vital to minimizing the
extent of spread. The results of this investigation highlight
the diversity of workers at risk for nosocomial exposures
and contribute to our understanding of risk factors for
SARS-CoV transmission, which may include being in
proximity to an infected patient or touching a contami-
nated surface.
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